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The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle and capital mobility: The role of the recent 
crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle has long been debated as it relates to the important topics 
of capital mobility and how to determine levels of investment.  Adopting a recursive approach 
and panel techniques, this paper explores the impacts of the recent financial crisis on the 
validity of the puzzle.  The OECD’s saving-investment correlation dropped to a record low just 
before the 2007/08 crisis began, reflecting the perceived ‘end’ of the FH puzzle in some studies.  
But since the onset of the crisis, our results indicate that this correlation has increased, 
suggesting the puzzle’s return.  The puzzle for net capital-importing and net capital-exporting 
countries differs, with the relationship being more significant for the exporters compared to the 
importers, reflecting the asymmetry in terms of the degree of any shocks across countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Capital mobility is central to open-economy macroeconomics following the removal of 
capital controls in many countries during the 1970s and 1980s.  Feldstein and Horioka (FH 
hereafter, 1980) investigated this phenomenon and found an unexpectedly high correlation 
between domestic saving and investment rates.  These results led FH (1980) to conclude that 
there was low capital mobility among OECD economies.  The paper soon became a puzzle as 
it contradicts the traditional wisdom of relatively high capital mobility among developed 
countries. 
The voluminous literature that has sprung up as a result reflects, in part, the important 
implications that the puzzle has on government policy.  First, if capital mobility is low, much 
of the increase in saving would be re-invested domestically (Feldstein, 1983; Schmidt-Hebbel 
et al., 1996; Coakley et al., 1998).  So governments might provide more incentives to encourage 
saving.  Second, in the absence of measurement errors, the difference between domestic saving 
and investment mirrors the current account balance.  A high saving-retention coefficient may 
therefore reflect governments’ targeting of a current account balance (Obstfeld, 1986; Roubini, 
1988; Summers, 1988; Coakley et al., 1996; Taylor, 2002).  Third, since the onset of the recent 
financial crisis, there has been repatriation of international capital back to domestic countries.  
This repatriation of finance may have affected the way in which saving and investment move 
across countries and as a relatively new theme, this has not as yet become apparent in the 
literature. 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by investigating the role of the 2008 
financial crisis in the puzzle’s development.  Specifically, this paper asks the following 
questions: Is the FH puzzle still a puzzle?  Did the recent financial crisis affect the puzzle’s 
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validity in the OECD and are the effects asymmetric across OECD countries?  The last two 
questions have not as far as we know been attempted in the literature yet.  This paper argues 
that the answer to all of the above is yes, and that the puzzle has returned post crisis.  This has 
important policy implications.  The rest of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 reviews the 
literature.  Section 3 sets out the methodology.  Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 
concludes with a policy discussion. 
2. Literature review 
In a world of perfect capital mobility, saving should be invested to ensure the highest 
return, regardless of geographical location.  Hence, there should be a low correlation between 
domestic saving and investment rates. FH (1980) challenged this post-war consensus by 
estimating the equation: 
 
 (𝐼 𝑌⁄ )𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(
𝑆
𝑌⁄ )𝑖  
(1) 
 
where 𝐼, 𝑆 and 𝑌 respectively denote investment, saving, and GDP of country 𝑖. 
In this cross-sectional model, 𝛽 is the saving-retention coefficient.  It measures how 
much domestic saving is retained for domestic investment.  FH (1980) tested the model for 
OECD countries over the period 1960-74 and found that 𝛽 was greater than 0.85 on average.  
This contradicts the post-World War II notion that capital mobility had improved among 
developed countries.  Referred to in many subsequent studies as the FH puzzle, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2000, p.175) coined the seminal work “the mother of all puzzles”. 
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2.1 – Empirical evidence for OECD countries 
Murphy (1984) re-investigated the saving-retention coefficient using a sample of 17 
OECD countries over 1960-80.  Sample countries were divided into big and small groups 
according to their investment shares.  Using a cross-sectional approach, small countries were 
found to display lower coefficients (0.57-0.59).  The group as a whole, nevertheless, exhibited 
strong saving-investment correlation.  For Murphy (1984), the FH model is a joint test for both 
capital mobility and that countries are small relative to the group.  His results questioned the 
robustness of FH’s (1980) findings across all countries.  Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) 
extended the sample period to 1960-86 and expanded the sample to 23 OECD countries.  While 
robust, the saving-retention coefficients showed signs of declining.  Many other FH-related 
studies largely confirmed the presence of the puzzle among OECD countries (Feldstein, 1983; 
Obstfeld, 1995; Armstrong et al., 1996; Coakley et al., 1996; Abbott and De Vita, 2003; 
Schmidt, 2003; Georgopoulos and Hejazi (2005); Narayan, 2005; Fouquau et al., 2008). 
Georgopoulos and Hejazi (2005) formalised the assessment of the decline of 𝛽, by 
adding a time interaction term to the pooled version of FH’s (1980) model: 
 
 (𝐼 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(
𝑆
𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿[(
𝑆
𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑡] + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
(2) 
 
where 𝑡 is time period of 1 to 31 years (1970-2000). 
Saving retention is thus measured by (𝛽 + 𝛿𝑡) instead of 𝛽 in FH’s (1980) sense.  𝛿 
was found to be negative and highly significant, meaning capital mobility was indeed 
increasing over time.  Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) observed that there were enduring current 
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account imbalances in Europe and re-tested FH’s (1980) model using a sample of OECD, EU 
and euro-area countries.  For euro-area sample countries, the saving-retention coefficient 
dropped from 0.41 over 1975-90 to 0.14 over 1991-2001.  This followed the policy of 
encouraging the free movement of capital within the euro area.  Whilst confirming the FH 
puzzle among OECD countries, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) claimed the end of the puzzle 
from a euro area’s perspective.  However, the puzzle’s disappearance in the euro area was 
shown to be ephemeral by Johnson and Lamdin (2013).  They took a sample of 17 euro-area 
and 10 other European countries.  An event-driven approach indicated the Euro crisis began in 
2006.  They then tested whether capital mobility had reduced as a result.  The coefficient was 
found to be positive and significant, translating to a 12% increase compared to the 𝛽 obtained 
in the base case scenario. 
 
2.2 – Alternative approaches to FH (1980) 
An emerging consensus in the literature is that ignoring structural breaks in the saving 
and investment series tends to bias the saving-retention coefficient upwards (Kejriwal, 2008; 
Guzel and Ozdemir, 2011; Ketenci, 2012, 2013).  For instance, Ketenci (2013) grouped his 
sample of OECD countries into EU15, countries in NAFTA agreements, and the G7.  He 
established both saving and investment series to be I(1) variables, which satisfied the pre-
requisite for conducting Hansen's (1992) stability test.  Next, taking the p-values from the 
MeanF, Ketenci (2013) was able to distinguish between stable and unstable countries within 
each subgroup.  Finally, Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimators returned saving-retention 
coefficients of 0.75 and 0.86 for full G7 and stable G7 sample countries, respectively, whereas 
all other 𝛽s were below 0.49.  Guzel and Ozdemir (2011) focused on Japan and the US and 
instead of sub-grouping, dummy variables were constructed for the endogenous break dates.  
Again, the 𝛽s displayed lower values compared to when the breaks were not accounted for. 
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Herwartz and Xu (2010) lent empirical support to the puzzle but offered caution 
regarding its interpretation with a functional model over the sample period 1972-2002.  They 
also distinguished the stable short-run saving-retention coefficient from the long-run.  The 
latter was found to be impacted by factors including government expenditure and exports, so 
that 𝛽, as in FH’s (1980) sense, might not just capture capital mobility.  A country size effect 
in the fashion of Murphy (1984) and Petreska and Mojsoska-Blazevski (2013) was again 
reported.  Bai and Zhang (2010) attributed the low capital mobility established under FH’s 
(1980) framework to potential financial frictions.  They found that capital immobility appeared 
to be caused by the interaction of the two types of frictions: limited enforcement (through a 
default penalty) and limited spanning (non-contingent bonds). 
              Coakley et al. (1996) and Krol (1996) challenged the puzzle’s existence using a long-
run current account solvency constraint.  For Krol (1996), the solvency constraint implied the 
current account averages would tend to zero.  Therefore, cross-sectional regressions using 
averaged domestic saving and investment rates would likely over-estimate the saving-retention 
coefficient.  From this perspective, panel regressions were deployed to estimate 21 sample 
OECD countries over the period 1962-90.  Their results produced estimates of 0.2 and the low 
value of 𝛽 led to the rejecting of the FH puzzle. 
The inclusion of Luxembourg as a potential outlier has been a common criticism by 
Tesar (1991), Jansen (2000), and Coiteux and Olivier (2000).  Re-examining the results without 
Luxembourg did yield very different conclusions in some cases.  This prompted an admission 
of possible sample selection bias (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996).  But Ho (2002), applying 
DOLS and Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimators, arrived at low saving-retention 
coefficients, with and without Luxembourg, thus bucking the selection bias argument. 
A further strand of the literature has concentrated on the time-varying nature of 
international capital mobility, in particular that it has changed according to policy regimes or 
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exchange rate systems.  A number of studies including Ozmen and Parmaksiz (2003) as well 
as Kejriwal (2008) introduced various types of structural breaks to model the regime changes.  
Recently a new theme in the literature has used Markov switching models to account for the 
changes in regime.  Telatar et al. (2007) assumed two regimes, one of which has high capital 
mobility, the other low mobility.  In the high capital mobility regime it was assumed that the 
FH puzzle did not hold: it only held where there was low capital mobility.  Their results 
suggested the FH puzzle was unstable and sensitive to policy regimes.  Chen and Shen (2015) 
have also used the Markov switching approach and found evidence of the time-varying nature 
of this relationship, as the saving-retention coefficients moved between high and low capital 
mobility regimes.  In addition they found the relationship varied across the countries in their 
sample, in particular members of the European Monetary System where capital was more 
mobile between member states, levels of saving were less of a constraint on investment after 
1990 and 2000. 
3. Methodology 
This study first draws on the different crisis experiences among net capital-importing 
and net capital-exporting countries.  It then investigates the time-varying saving-retention 
coefficients using recursive estimations.  Three panel techniques – Pooled OLS, the Fixed 
Effects (FE) and the Random Effects (RE) – are subsequently employed to examine any 
asymmetry.  There are two main advantages to using panel data.  First, the crisis is not yet 
completely over, meaning the number of observations is limited.  Panel data also enables higher 
efficiency and less bias (Baltagi, 2005).  Second, as Gujarati and Porter (2009) pointed out, 
there is the likelihood of heterogeneity bias in countries and this individuality can be captured 
by employing FE and RE models, Bebczuk and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010) were the first to apply 
these methods to the FH puzzle. 
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3.1 – Data  
The data is from 1980 to 2012 on an annual basis and all is taken from the IMF WEO 
database.  Complete data on 𝐼 𝑌⁄  and 
𝑆
𝑌⁄  for 27 out of 34 current OECD countries from 1980 
to 2012 yields a balanced panel of 108 observations (4 years and 27 countries) for the post-
crisis period (2009-2012). 
 
3.2 – Recursive estimations 
The time-varying 𝛽  across the OECD are examined using recursive estimations.  
Kalman (1960) first derived recursive least squares within a state-space model.  A 𝛽 estimate 
is given at each point in time; by plotting the 𝛽 time series, the evolution of the correlation can 
be traced out.  In this model, the time-varying coefficient and also the unobservable state 
variable are assumed to follow an autoregressive process.  The recursive system is then written 
into two equations for each country (Duncan and Horn, 1972).  The first is an observation 
equation that models the relationship between the observable and unobservable state variables: 
(𝐼 𝑌⁄ )𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡(
𝑆
𝑌⁄ )𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 .  The second is a dynamic state equation that describes the 
autoregressive process: 𝛽𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡𝛽𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡. 
 
3.3 – Panel estimations: 5 years pre and post crisis 
The panel techniques are employed to investigate the saving-investment correlation in 
the historical period (1980-2003), 5 years prior to (2004-08), and 5 years after the crisis (2008-
12).  A time-trend interaction term is added to the estimations, following Georgopoulos and 
Hejazi (2005) in (2).  To ensure robust estimates, white-period standard errors are computed.  
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But as cross-period differences are already considered by dividing the sample period, FE and 
RE only look at cross-country heterogeneity as follows: 
 
 (𝐼 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽(
𝑆
𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
(3) 
 
where 𝑐𝑖 is the specific intercept for each country 𝑖.  𝑐𝑖 is reported as an average: ∑
𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
Restrictions in addition to standard Gauss-Markov assumptions apply here.  The FE 
model, for instance, requires (𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖
 to be changing over time, which is true as suggested by 
our data.  On the other hand, the RE model assumes 𝐸[𝑐𝑖|(
𝑆
𝑌⁄ )𝑖] = 𝛼 and thus rules out any 
correlation between the country-specific intercept and that country’s saving rate.  This is a key 
contrast to FE, which allows for such correlation (Wooldridge, 2013).  In fact, if 
𝐸[𝑐𝑖|(
𝑆
𝑌⁄ )𝑖] ≠ 𝛼, only FE is unbiased whereas if 𝐸[𝑐𝑖|(
𝑆
𝑌⁄ )𝑖] = 𝛼, RE is more efficient. 
Therefore, an important question is whether theoretically there is some correlation 
between the unobserved country heterogeneity and their saving rate.  Such correlation is 
possible, but also difficult to determine a priori.  Subsequently, the Hausman test is conducted 
to determine the relative suitability of FE and RE (Hausman, 1978).  The test assumes the 
superiority of RE unless rejected by test-statistics.  But a failure to reject can also mean that 
RE and FE estimates are close enough that it does not matter which one to choose.  In 
computing p-values, ordinary coefficient covariance instead of robust standard errors is used, 
as the latter may be inconsistent with Hausman test variance calculation assumptions (Hoechle, 
2007). 
Finally, the same exercise is repeated for net capital-exporting and net capital-importing 
countries to compare the potential asymmetric effects of the recent financial crisis.β 
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4. Empirical results 
This section discusses the cross-section averages and examines the net balance of 
capital exports/imports.  The latter helps group countries according to their relative position of 
capital exporting/importing.  This will play a key role in subsequent panel estimations.  The 
first two numerical columns in Table 1a show the averages of the investment and saving rates.  
Korea appears to have the highest average investment and saving rates in the sample, 31.77% 
and 32.99% respectively.  Domestic capital formation thus comes across as a substantial input 
into Korea’s economy.  This is especially true for the decade prior to the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis: Korea’s investment rate was above 35% at all times and reached its apogee of 40% in 
1991, the highest in the entire dataset. 
Appearing at the other end of the spectrum is the UK.  Not only does it have the lowest 
average investment and saving rates (17.43% and 15.95%, respectively), but up till the recent 
crisis (2005-08), the UK investment rate had also been among the lowest of its OECD peers.  
Similarly, the UK saving rate was among the lowest since the 90s, nearing the bottom end with 
other crisis-ridden states including Iceland, Greece and Portugal.  This is in line with Blanchard 
and Giavazzi (2002) who showed the ‘end’ of the FH puzzle and argued for the continuation 
of current account imbalances in the region.  The countries’ saving rates stayed low beyond the 
early 2000s and continued as the crisis loomed.  But the recent low saving rate is more likely 
due to lowered income. 
The next column calculates the difference between the investment and saving rates.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the same crisis-hit countries are the top three net importers of capital 
in the sample: Iceland has an average of 5.11% investment over its saving rate; Greece has 5.6% 
and Portugal has 6.26%.  In contrast, Luxembourg, Norway and the Netherlands come across 
as the largest exporters of capital in the sample. The far right column of Table 1a indicates the 
resulting classification of the countries into capital exporters and importers. 
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Year-on-year, the majority of countries fluctuate between being a net capital-exporter 
and importer. This serves to remind us that grouping countries based on particular 
characteristics is a simplification, and thus conclusions drawn from this exercise should be 
viewed with caution.  Nevertheless, some countries, notably Australia, Greece, New Zealand 
and the United States, have been consistently net capital-importers throughout the 33-year 
period, as shown in the first numerical column in Table 1b.  As a group generally they have 
suffered more during the 2008 financial crisis, with 13 out of the 16 net capital-importing 
countries having investment rates exceeding saving rates for at least 22 of the 33 years in 
question. 
The last two columns in Table 1b test for the equality of the means and medians between 
each country’s investment and saving rates.  The Satterthwaite-Welch test is a powerful non-
parametric test for comparing 𝐼 𝑌⁄  and 
𝑆
𝑌⁄ , and tests the null that the two have identical 
distributions with respect to the mean.  The Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test also compares 𝐼 𝑌⁄  
and 𝑆 𝑌⁄ , but tests for the equality of the median.  On the whole, the two tests report similar 
results, mostly providing evidence against FH over the entire time span.  Austria, Finland, 
France and Germany have a negligible balance of capital exporting below 1%.  Their 
differences in the mean and median of investment and saving rates are also reported as 
insignificant.  Ireland, despite its 1.67% net capital imports, is not rejected either by the two 
tests for mean and median equality.  This suggests a higher level of volatility in Ireland’s series. 
What is apparent so far is the stark difference in the performance of net capital exporters 
and importers post crisis.  Whether the crisis has asymmetrically affected β in these country 
groups is a key question to be addressed in Section 4.2.  For panel estimation purposes, 
countries with a positive surplus of domestic investment over saving (Table 1a) are grouped as 
‘net capital-importing countries’.  The rest are ‘net capital-exporting countries’. 
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4.1 – Recursive estimation results 
The time-varying 𝛽 for each country is summarised in Figure 1.  Over the sample period, 
the FH puzzle has abated somewhat.  The majority of the sample countries have their Beta in 
2012 lower than in 1980.  But the magnitude of these estimates should be interpreted with care.  
They are not directly comparable to other studies such as Abbott and De Vita (2003) which 
adopted different approaches.  That said, inferences can still be made regarding betas’ trends.  
For example, Austria’s 𝛽 gradually declined from about 3 to 0.5.  This implies that over the 
course of three decades, less of Austrian saving is reinvested domestically.  Very similar 
patterns exist for Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and Turkey.  Close panel 
results would be strong support for the findings. 
Net capital-importing countries seem to have a more problematic experience compared 
to their capital-exporting counterparts.  The time-varying Beta for Greece, for instance, was 
about 0.8 in 1999.   In part, this reflects the widening current account imbalance of the country 
as documented by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002).  A much smaller part of Greece’s investment 
was, in turn, financed by domestic capital than before.  One possibility is the increase in 
investors’ confidence in the country’s prospect of delivering a high return.  This seemingly 
supports the claim that the FH puzzle had faded away temporarily. 
Since 2008 however, Greece’s beta has reversed its trend.  It has come back up to 0.4 
in 2012.  Although these results cannot compare to cross-section estimates directly, it is clear 
that more of Greece’s investment is now funded by domestic saving.  Other net capital-
importing peers including Italy have had a similar trend, but not as obvious as Greece’s.  
Interestingly, several other crisis-hit countries like Spain and Portugal have an upward trending 
β overall.  This is further examined in the panel estimations to follow.  Surprisingly for the UK 
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and the US, the time-varying saving-retention coefficients are little changed around the crisis.  
This comes across although the two economies suffered quite considerably in the recent crisis.  
The general picture in terms of the puzzle’s validity for some of the net capital-exporting 
countries is mixed.  Luxembourg and Norway, the two countries mentioned in Section 4.1, 
exhibit no definite trends in their β over time, except an early drop for Luxembourg.  The same 
holds for Japan, apart from the fluctuations felt in the 1980s.  The Japanese asset price bubble 
might have encouraged more of its national saving to be reinvested in the housing market.  In 
fact, in the five years leading up to 1991 when asset prices began to fall, the saving-investment 
correlation went up gradually.  But since then it has remained constant. 
 
4.2 – Panel estimations for the OECD 
Subsequent sections discuss in turn the panel estimation results for the OECD, net 
capital exporters and net capital importers.  The section above provides further details on how 
to arrive at country groupings. 
 
4.2.1 – Beta falling 1980-2003: matching recursive estimates 
Panel estimates in Table 2 largely correspond to the previous recursive estimates, 
although there are exceptions such as France, the Netherlands and New Zealand1.  Using 
Pooled OLS, β in the historical period is 0.57, which is statistically significant at 1%.  This is 
close to the saving-investment correlation in the original sense of FH (1980).  Already, our 
                                                          
1 Although for some countries such as France, the Netherlands and New Zealand as well as Greece between 1980 
and 2006 there appears to be little change in the value of beta across the data span, this suggests for them the F-H 
puzzle may not hold, however for most countries the change is more apparent. So the panel data results indicating 
the F-H puzzle has varied around the financial crisis may not hold individually in all the countries in the sample. 
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historical β is markedly below studies that investigated the issue using OECD data from 1960 
to 1980 (Sachs et al., 1981; Sachs, 1983; Coakley et al., 1996).  But equally interesting is the 
time trend interaction term.  Albeit only -0.0066, it lowers over time the marginal effect of 
saving (MES), which is defined as: 
 
 𝑀𝐸𝑆 =
𝜕(𝐼 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡
𝜕(𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡
=
𝜕𝛽(𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡
𝜕(𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡
+
𝜕𝛿(𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡∗𝑡
𝜕(𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽 + 𝛿𝑡  
(4) 
 
             At year 2003, 𝑡 = 24, so 𝑀𝐸𝑆 = 0.57 − 0.0066 ∗ 24 ≈ 0.41.  This provides strong 
support for the decreasing correlation between domestic saving and investment over time, 
consistent with Younas and Chakraborty (2011).  In part, this reflects the continuous 
enhancement of the financial markets and trade linkages that present investors with a wider set 
of foreign investment opportunities.  In fact, FE and RE results tell a similar story in the 
historical period.  The β is significantly lower than studies that looked at earlier periods, and 
the MES lowered to around 0.33 by 2003.  Nevertheless, in the historical period, the Hausman 
test rejects RE estimate which returns a much lower R-squared than FE’s.  This suggests that 
FE may better capture cross-section heterogeneity that is likely to be correlated with saving 
rates. 
 
4.2.2 – Beta below zero before crisis, reflecting soaring capital flows 
Historical estimates are in line with Fouquau et al. (2008), Bai and Zhang (2010) and 
Petreska and Mojsoska-Blazevski (2013), underlying the trend of increasing capital mobility 
among OECD countries.  Yet, this alone does not completely explain the soaring capital flows 
in the build-up to the crisis.  Estimates for 2004-08 may give part of the answer to that.  All 
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estimations strikingly report negative Betas.  A theoretical explanation of this by Westphal 
(1983) is that high world interest rates induce high domestic interest rates.  Domestic saving, 
in turn, is driven up, and investment would likely experience a decline.  Again, the Hausman 
test favours FE which gives an R-squared significantly higher than both Pooled OLS and RE.  
The FE result has lost significance, as did other estimations to a lesser extent, suggesting that 
domestic saving no longer explained domestic investment in the pre-crisis , unlike the historical 
period. 
The negative β supports the claim of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) that the FH puzzle 
had ended in the broader set of OECD countries.  Indeed, not only was capital mobility much 
higher than in the previous two decades, but investors generally were less concerned about the 
risk and uncertainty of overseas investment.  Another possibility is financial and capital 
account deregulation.  Central bankers and governments around the world were generally more 
relaxed about capital inflows.  Data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) suggests 
that gross capital inflows2 surged from a little above 6% of GDP in 2003 to almost 20% in 
2007, echoing the passing away of the FH puzzle. 
 
4.2.3 – FH puzzle returns post crisis 
Buoyant expectations on investment returns have reversed since the onset of the crisis, 
as have the β estimates.  Pooled OLS and RE both report a dramatic pick-up in the saving-
retention coefficient from below zero to above 0.7.  They have also regained their statistical 
significance at the 1% level, being accompanied by a negative time-trend once more.  Together 
with an OLS R-squared of 0.27, it is possible to infer a remarkably lower capital mobility post 
crisis.  From 2004 through to 2008, domestic investment could not be meaningfully explained 
                                                          
2 Measured as the sum of global net purchases of domestic assets by foreigners. 
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by domestic saving.  But since 2008 about 70% of domestic investment has been channelled 
from domestic saving in the OECD.  BIS data again resonates with the reappearance of the FH 
puzzle – global capital inflows have shrunk from nearly 20% to merely 2% of GDP in just one 
year to 2009. 
This is, however, only one aspect of the story.  It is also important to note that the 
biggest fall in both saving and investment rates was in 2008/09, amounting to 3-4% of GDP.  
Taken together with the increased saving-retention coefficient, we may suggest two 
characteristics of investors.  First, investor confidence has suffered a huge decline since the 
crisis.  This may reflect a much lower willingness to invest as a percentage of income.  Second, 
investors’ risk profiles shifted back to domestic countries.  Clouded with international 
uncertainty, investors would now rather put a significant portion of their saving in their home 
economy, where withdrawal may be easier in the event of any tail risk materialising.  From a 
macroprudential viewpoint, tightened regulation since the collapse of Lehman Brothers might 
have also discouraged foreign banks and other financial intermediaries from providing credit 
to the domestic economy.  In the UK, for instance, lending growth from foreign bank branches 
fell much more than that from domestic banks (Hoggarth et al., 2013). 
What is perhaps equally surprising is that beta has attained a level higher than the 
historical trend.  While decades of financial integration should not have completely been 
reversed, domestic saving from national income seemed to be temporarily more invested at 
home compared to thirty years previously.  The bottom line here is that capital mobility and 
thus the validity of the FH puzzle have altered.  The puzzle ‘disappeared’ briefly prior to the 
crisis but then came back into the picture. 
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4.2.4 – Less capital volatility in net capital exporters pre and post crisis 
The final question posed by this paper is addressed here.  According to Table 3, the 
saving-retention coefficient for 2004-08 is not noticeably different for net capital-exporting 
countries compared to the OECD.  The drop in beta estimates and their statistical significance 
similarly apply to this subgroup.  A dramatic fall is seen across the board, with FE and RE both 
reporting a Beta of -0.21 though the Hausman test favours RE with a p-value of 0.39.  However, 
since the beginning of the Great Recession, saving-retention coefficients rebounded to between 
0.59-0.69 (Table 3).  Qualifying the findings, the Hausman test again fails to reject RE in the 
post-crisis period, as is the case for the OECD.  In OLS as well as in RE, evidence points to a 
less pronounced return of the FH puzzle for net capital-exporting countries, a signal that their 
capital mobility might not be as tumultuous as the OECD group.  This might help explain why 
some of these countries have fared better than their net capital-importing counterparts. 
 
4.2.5 – A more unsettling experience for net capital importers 
For net capital-importing countries in Table 4, an observation regarding the historical 
and pre-crisis periods similar to the other groups is possible.  In the build-up to 2008, pooled 
OLS, FE and RE estimates have all lost statistical significance, suggesting domestic saving is 
not related to domestic investment.  Net capital-importing countries might be more successful 
in attracting foreign funds.  Greece, for instance, sustained a widening current account balance 
up until 2009, indicating the FH puzzle had vanished for that period. 
At the outset of the crisis however, a more troubling tale of volatility emerged.   The 
consistently insignificant saving-retention coefficients pre crisis were perhaps a precursor of 
more drastic corrections to come.  In 2008-12, the β for net capital-importing countries has 
reversed to above the OECD’s, though not all results are in agreement.  Table 4 shows beta 
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rose to 1.19 according to Pooled OLS and RE estimates, suggesting a 1% decrease in saving 
on average leads to a 1.19% decrease in investment. However the Hausman test indicates FE 
is the most appropriate model in this case, which produces an insignificant relationship. Across 
estimation methods, the R-squared is higher for net capital-importing countries than for the 
OECD in the post-crisis period.  In part, this could be attributed to a deeper crisis of confidence 
among net capital-importing countries than their net capital-exporting peers.  Investors might 
be more concerned about the high level of debt built up in the period of escalating capital flows.  
This answers the last question of this paper – the impact of the crisis on the validity of 
the FH puzzle is likely to have been asymmetric.  Net capital-exporting countries do not seem 
to have experienced a ‘crisis’ at all, with the saving-retention coefficient little changed around 
the crisis.  On the contrary, net capital-importing countries have had a more unsettling 
experience.  Their β dropped to a lower level compared to the OECD as a whole, and the 
setback was also more powerful. 
5. Conclusion 
According to the panel results, the OECD’s saving-retention coefficient stands at a high 
post-crisis, albeit with a substantial decline from the historical period.  There is also a good 
level of agreement from the recursive estimates.  The crisis substantially affected the puzzle’s 
validity.  For the OECD and net capital-importing countries, the puzzle seems to have faded 
away in the build-up to the crisis, with largely insignificant and near-zero saving-retention 
coefficients in 2004-08.  But this has reversed since the crisis.  The findings match the 
hypothesis of international capital movement causing financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). 
Importantly, net capital-exporters and importers experienced capital volatility to 
different extents.  The saving-retention coefficient for net capital-importing countries became 
19 
 
more statistically irrelevant pre crisis, then faced an even more sobering bounce-back post 2008.  
Therefore, the effects can be said to be asymmetric in magnitude.  Two striking impressions 
have arisen from the analysis.  First, an unusually low β pre crisis preceded a high saving-
investment correlation post crisis.  This is evident across country groups.  Second, the net 
capital-importing subgroup which has a more fluctuating β comprises countries hardest hit by 
the crisis.  They include Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal.  Could a remarkable 
decline of β be an early warning signal?  Also after the crisis has hit, are there policies that 
governments may consider to alleviate the necessary recession? 
In this light, the OECD experience of the FH puzzle can be a lesson to both 
macroprudential and fiscal policymakers, in that order.  This reflects the relative importance of 
preventing an excessive retreat of capital.  From a macroprudential viewpoint, this paper is not 
to judge that a low β is bad per se – it merely reflects a wider array of investment opportunities.  
But what macroprudential policymakers have to be careful about are the possible financial 
inter-linkages built up in the period of low saving-investment correlation.  If these inter-
linkages are proved to be systemic, as in the case of the recent crisis, failure in one region can 
be contagious.  Clearly, in the aftermath of a crisis, short-term capital control measures can be 
beneficial to countries which would otherwise have seen substantial capital outflows.  Having 
closely followed the unfolding of events, the IMF (2012) adopted a shift in its institutional 
view on capital controls.  It argued that countries may benefit from placing short-term capital 
controls to counter disruptive outflows which may cause market panic and currency 
depreciation. 
However, arguably macroprudential policymakers should take a more ex-ante view.  
This study shows that OECD countries should have placed these short-term capital control 
measures before the crisis hit in 2008.  The low saving-investment correlation can be an early 
warning indicator.  When the OECD β loses its significance and drops to record lows, a closer 
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look into the financial linkages between countries could be warranted.  Tighter stress tests for 
lending institutions can be a first step.  If low βs persist, short-term capital controls could be 
considered by central bankers to combat a possibly sharp reversion in beta.  This is particularly 
true for countries that have a history of net capital imports.  For these countries, a low β can be 
seen as a precursor to a pick-up later on.  A more forward-looking view can prevent such 
fluctuation.  Nevertheless, the cyclicality of the saving-retention coefficient established in this 
study may not apply to all other crises.  This is left as a potential area for future research. 
This study has aimed to shed light on the following questions: Is the FH puzzle still a 
puzzle?  Did the recent financial crisis affect the puzzle’s validity in the OECD and are the 
effects asymmetric across OECD countries? While the first question has been attempted many 
times in the literature, the second and third are as far as we know original to this paper.  The 
short answer to all of them is yes. Using beta as a warning signal is preventative.  But there are 
also options for fiscal policymakers to consider once a crisis hits.  For both the OECD and 
other subgroups, post-crisis saving-investment correlations are largely statistically significant, 
ranging from 0.29 to 0.54.  If domestic investment is a crucial driver of growth in an economy 
(e.g. Korea in Section 4.1), the government can encourage saving.  Through the relationship 
established between saving and investment, an extra unit of saving can deliver as much as 54% 
of investment channelled back to the domestic economy.  This recommendation was first 
documented in the original seminal paper by FH (1980), but is equally applicable in a crisis 
environment where β has been generally picking up. 
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Table 1a – Cross-section averages of annual data from 1980 to 2012 
Country 𝐼
𝑌⁄  (%) 
𝑆
𝑌⁄  (%) 
𝐼
𝑌⁄ −
𝑆
𝑌⁄   (%) 
Net capital-exporting or 
net capital-importing? 
Australia 26.21 21.50 4.71 Net capital-importing 
Austria 24.38 24.19 0.19 Net capital-importing 
Belgium 21.22 22.57 -1.35 Net capital-exporting 
Canada 21.72 20.18 1.54 Net capital-importing 
Denmark 19.70 21.34 -1.64 Net capital-exporting 
Finland 22.23 23.28 -1.05 Net capital-exporting 
France 19.59 19.62 -0.03 Net capital-exporting 
Germany 21.55 22.53 -0.98 Net capital-exporting 
Greece 21.77 16.17 5.6 Net capital-importing 
Hungary 24.07 20.43 3.64 Net capital-importing 
Iceland 21.07 15.96 5.11 Net capital-importing 
Ireland 20.52 18.85 1.67 Net capital-importing 
Israel 21.82 19.46 2.36 Net capital-importing 
Italy 21.39 20.20 1.19 Net capital-importing 
Japan 26.42 28.81 -2.39 Net capital-exporting 
Korea 31.77 32.99 -1.22 Net capital-exporting 
Luxembourg 21.17 28.97 -7.8 Net capital-exporting 
Mexico 23.85 22.22 1.63 Net capital-importing 
Netherlands 20.84 25.48 -4.64 Net capital-exporting 
New Zealand 21.74 16.93 4.81 Net capital-importing 
Norway 23.63 30.37 -6.74 Net capital-exporting 
Portugal 26.49 20.23 6.26 Net capital-importing 
Spain 24.06 21.13 2.93 Net capital-importing 
Sweden 18.94 21.54 -2.6 Net capital-exporting 
Turkey 21.35 19.09 2.26 Net capital-importing 
United Kingdom 17.43 15.95 1.48 Net capital-importing 
United States 21.89 18.87 3.02 Net capital-importing 
The classification of net capital-exporting and –importing of a country is based on the difference between its 
average investment and saving rates taken across the 33-year period. 
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Table 2b – Cross-section averages of annual data from 1980 to 2012 (continued) 
Country Number of years 
net capital-exporting 
Satterthwaite-Welch 
t-statistic 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 
t-statistic 
Australia 0 9.13*** 6.19*** 
Austria 14 0.45 0.40 
Belgium 23 -2.08** 2.24** 
Canada 11 2.49** 2.14** 
Denmark 22 -3.11*** 2.64*** 
Finland 17 -1.08 1.23 
France 15 -0.084 0.00 
Germany 15 -1.58 1.06 
Greece 0 6.33*** 5.44*** 
Hungary 5 3.87*** 3.54*** 
Iceland 8 3.51*** 3.16*** 
Ireland 12 1.53 1.46 
Israel 12 2.99*** 1.85* 
Italy 8 2.68*** 2.42** 
Japan 32 -2.59** 2.25** 
Korea 20 -1.34 1.82* 
Luxembourg 28 -6.22*** 4.87*** 
Mexico 4 2.30** 1.86* 
Netherlands 32 -10.42*** 6.62*** 
New Zealand 0 8.46*** 6.12*** 
Norway 28 -6.22*** 4.96*** 
Portugal 2 4.52*** 3.73*** 
Spain 3 4.69*** 3.66*** 
Sweden 22 -3.54*** 3.37*** 
Turkey 5 2.81*** 2.35** 
United Kingdom 4 3.47*** 2.95*** 
United States 0 6.23*** 5.05*** 
The number of years a country’s saving rate exceeds its investment rate. * Significant at 10% ** Significant 
at 5% *** Significant at 1%. Satterthwaite-Welch and Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney t-statistics have the null 
hypothesis of equality of the means and medians, respectively, between 𝐼 𝑌⁄  and 
𝑆
𝑌⁄  for each sample country. 
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Table 2 – Panel estimations for the OECD 
Estimation 
technique 
Time period Constant (𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡
 (𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑡 
R-squared Hausman 
test 
(p-value) 
Pooled 
OLS 
Historical 
(1980-2003) 
12.01*** 
(2.17) 
0.57*** 
(0.10) 
-0.0066*** 
(0.0012) 
0.41 - 
5 years prior to crisis 
(2004-08) 
23.10*** 
(2.12) 
-0.35** 
(0.16) 
0.013*** 
(0.0039) 
0.015 - 
5 years post crisis 
(2008-12) 
14.89*** 
(1.29) 
0.75*** 
(0.21) 
-0.016** 
(0.020) 
0.27 - 
Fixed 
Effects 
(FE) 
Historical 
(1980-2003) 
14.20*** 
(0.95) 
0.47*** 
(0.04) 
-0.0059*** 
(0.0012) 
0.71 - 
5 years prior to crisis 
(2004-08) 
17.36*** 
(1.79) 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
0.016*** 
(0.0032) 
0.90 - 
5 years post crisis 
(2008-12) 
19.15*** 
(5.47) 
0.59* 
(0.31) 
-0.017** 
(0.0075) 
0.75 - 
Random 
Effects 
(RE) 
Historical 
(1980-2003) 
13.93*** 
(0.98) 
0.48*** 
(0.047) 
-0.0059*** 
(0.0012) 
0.32 0.0069 
5 years prior to crisis 
(2004-08) 
19.15*** 
(1.56) 
-0.26** 
(0.13) 
0.016*** 
(0.0031) 
0.20 0.0002 
5 years post crisis 
(2008-12) 
16.16*** 
(2.06) 
0.71*** 
(0.22) 
-0.016** 
(0.0066) 
0.12 0.23 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%.  White-period standard error in parenthesis.  
The Hausman test is based on ordinary coefficient covariance method as robust standard errors may be 
inconsistent with Hausman test variance calculation assumptions. 
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Table 3 – Panel estimations for net capital-exporting countries 
Estimation 
technique 
Time period Constant (𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡
 (𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑡 
R-squared Hausman 
test 
(p-value) 
Pooled 
OLS 
Historical 
(1980-2003) 
7.21** 
(3.06) 
0.76*** 
(0.14) 
-0.0097*** 
(0.0015) 
0.60 - 
5 years prior to crisis 
(2004-08) 
13.92*** 
(4.02) 
-0.14 
(0.25) 
0.016*** 
(0.0036) 
0.25 - 
5 years post crisis 
(2008-12) 
11.56*** 
(3.27) 
0.59** 
(0.24) 
-0.0074 
(0.0055) 
0.35 - 
Fixed 
Effects 
(FE) 
Historical 
(1980-2003) 
13.25*** 
(1.53) 
0.49*** 
(0.073) 
-0.0080*** 
(0.0019) 
0.81 - 
5 years prior to crisis 
(2004-08) 
14.56*** 
(1.38) 
-0.21* 
(0.12) 
0.018*** 
(0.0031) 
0.96 - 
5 years post crisis 
(2008-12) 
7.92** 
(3.17) 
0.69*** 
(0.21) 
-0.0057 
(0.0068) 
0.90 - 
Random 
Effects 
(RE) 
Historical 
(1980-2003) 
12.27*** 
(1.55) 
0.53*** 
(0.082) 
-0.0082*** 
(0.0018) 
0.42 0.0003 
5 years prior to crisis 
(2004-08) 
14.49*** 
(1.19) 
-0.21* 
(0.12) 
0.018*** 
(0.0028) 
0.64 0.39 
5 years post crisis 
(2008-12) 
8.99*** 
(2.43) 
0.65*** 
(0.20) 
-0.0061 
(0.0058) 
0.40 0.51 
See Table 2’s footnote. 
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Table 4 – Panel estimations for net capital-importing countries 
Estimation 
technique 
Time period Constant (𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡
 (𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑡 
R-squared Hausman 
test 
(p-value) 
Pooled 
OLS 
Historical 
(1980-2003) 
10.25*** 
(1.63) 
0.66*** 
(0.073) 
-0.0034*** 
(0.0016) 
0.38 - 
5 years prior to crisis 
(2004-08) 
22.75*** 
(2.84) 
-0.13 
(0.21) 
0.0069 
(0.0058) 
0.0096 - 
5 years post crisis 
(2008-12) 
13.66*** 
(1.90) 
1.19*** 
(0.44) 
-0.026* 
(0.014) 
0.34 - 
Fixed 
Effects 
(FE) 
Historical 
(1980-2003) 
13.92*** 
(1.17) 
0.48*** 
(0.049) 
-0.0037** 
(0.0015) 
0.61 - 
5 years prior to crisis 
(2004-08) 
19.25*** 
(1.87) 
-0.13 
(0.22) 
0.014** 
(0.0058) 
0.85 - 
5 years post crisis 
(2008-12) 
23.88*** 
(4.56) 
0.70 
(0.56) 
-0.030** 
(0.015) 
0.73 - 
Random 
Effects 
(RE) 
Historical 
(1980-2003) 
13.46*** 
(1.20) 
0.51*** 
(0.043) 
-0.0036** 
(0.0014) 
0.29 0.032 
5 years prior to crisis 
(2004-08) 
20.30*** 
(1.99) 
-0.15 
(0.20) 
0.013** 
(0.0052) 
0.10 0.046 
5 years post crisis 
(2008-12) 
16.11*** 
(2.54) 
1.11** 
(0.44) 
-0.028** 
(0.014) 
0.14 0.0007 
See Table 2’s footnote. 
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Figure 1 – Summary of recursive estimation results 
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  Recursive (β+δ*t) estimates 
  ± 2 standard errors 
